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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1909 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
OTTO HARRIS, 
 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-09-cr-00303-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Alan N. Bloch 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 27, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 27, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
___________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Otto Harris was convicted by a jury of violating the felon-in-possession statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g), by possessing an assault rifle despite having several prior felony 
convictions.  He now appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred by 
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sentencing him pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e).  Harris further challenges his conviction by arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is 
unconstitutional.  We will affirm. 
I.   
We write solely for the parties’ benefit and thus recite only the facts essential to 
our disposition.  Because this appeal comes to us following a jury’s guilty verdict, we set 
forth the facts as viewed in the light most favorable to the Government. 
 On November 12, 2009, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging 
Harris with possessing an assault rifle after having been convicted of two prior felonies in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).  At trial, the parties stipulated that Harris 
had previously been convicted of a felony at the time he was alleged to have possessed a 
firearm.  Appendix (“App.”) 215.  Harris’s central argument was that the Government 
failed to prove his possession of a firearm affected interstate commerce.  App. 281.  On 
December 1, 2010, following a two-day trial, Harris was found guilty. 
 Prior to sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended that 
Harris be sentenced under the ACCA, which requires a minimum sentence of 180 months 
of incarceration when a defendant has committed three serious drug offenses on different 
occasions.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  Harris objected to the PSR, arguing that it had not 
been shown that his prior drug offenses were committed on separate dates.  The District 
Judge overruled the objection and sentenced Harris to a term of 188 months of 
imprisonment and five years of supervised release, a sentence at the bottom of the 
advisory guidelines range after application of the ACCA.  App. 18-20. 
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II. 
Because Harris raises purely legal issues on appeal, our review of Harris’s 
conviction and sentence is plenary.   United States v. Coleman, 451 F.3d 154, 156 (3d 
Cir. 2006). 
Harris first asserts that the District Court erred by applying the ACCA because 
there was insufficient proof that he had committed three prior drug offenses on separate 
occasions.  Under the ACCA, a district court must sentence a defendant who violated 18 
U.S.C.§ 922(g) to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years when the defendant 
“has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, 
committed on occasions different from one another.”  18 U.S.C.§ 924(e)(1).  The 
existence of the requisite prior convictions “may be determined by the District Court by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”  Coleman, 451 F.3d at 159.1
                                              
1  Although Harris argues his prior convictions should have been proven to a jury 
applying a reasonable doubt standard, this argument is plainly contrary to binding 
Supreme Court precedent.  See United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 243-
44 (1998) (holding that earlier crimes which enhance a defendant’s sentence need not be 
charged in an indictment or proven at trial); see also United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 
236, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming that Almendarez-Torres remains binding 
precedent). 
  In making this 
determination, the District Court’s inquiry “is limited to the terms of the charging 
document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and 
defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to 
some comparable judicial record of this information.”  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 
13, 26 (2005). 
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The offenses which served as the basis for the application of the ACCA involved 
convictions in 2001 and 2005.  The 2001 conviction involved Harris’s guilty plea to three 
separate counts of drug distribution which occurred, according to the indictment, “on (or 
about)” October 15, 1998; October 20, 1998; and November 20, 1998.  App. 15-18.  
Although the dates charged in the 2001 indictment were not substantive elements of the 
offenses, the indictment nonetheless contained factual matter which was sufficient for the 
District Court to conclude that Harris’s 2001 conviction, when coupled with his 2005 
conviction, represented at least three separate occasions on which Harris committed 
serious drug offenses.  Thus, the District Court’s application of the ACCA’s mandatory 
minimum was appropriate. 
 Harris also asserts that the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is 
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to his conduct.  Harris’s facial challenge 
rests on his argument that the conduct proscribed by the statute – the intrastate possession 
of a firearm – does not substantially affect interstate commerce and thus the statute is not 
a valid exercise of the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.  We have 
already rejected this argument in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 
2001), where we held that section 922(g) remained constitutional despite the Supreme 
Court’s evolving Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  As we explained, “the transport of a 
weapon in interstate commerce, however remote in the distant past, gives its present 
intrastate possession a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce” so as to establish federal 
jurisdiction.  Id.  We see no need to revisit that decision. 
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 As for Harris’s as applied challenge, it too is without merit.  Proof that a firearm 
“traveled in interstate commerce, at some time in the past, [is] sufficient to satisfy the 
interstate commerce element” of the felon-in-possession statute.  Id. at 205.  To 
demonstrate that a firearm has been transported across state lines, the Government need 
only offer evidence that “the firearm was manufactured in a state other than the state 
where the possession occurred.”  United States v. Shambry, 392 F.3d 631, 634-35 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  Here, the Government introduced evidence showing that the firearm at issue 
was manufactured in Vermont, and that Harris had possessed it in Pennsylvania.  This 
plainly satisfies the interstate commerce requirement of section 922(g).  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the conviction and sentence of the 
District Court.   
